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NORTH DAKOTA LAw REVIEW
Skeptics might criticize the statute for being too liberal, claim-
ing the offender can use the provision as a shield. This, however,
is not necessarily true. With the exception of an atrocious offense
such as murder, the average youthful offender commits a relatively
minor ifraction that would warrant only a nominal fine if com-
mitted by an adult. In all too many circumstances, a parent pays
the fine and the child learns little, if anything, from the experience
in court. On the other hand, if the same child must face the juvenile
authorities, the Juvenile Commissioner, in the presence of the par-
ents, has the necessary power 36 to make the meaning of respon-
sibility better known to the child, the one needing it the most.
Idealistically a law should provide for all possible circumstances,
but reality shows that none do. Both methods discussed for treat-
ing youthful offenders have merit, but the one employing the age
at the time of the offense is preferable. Specifically, the approach
provides a greater guarantee of justice by devaluating a delay in
proceedings until the accused reaches the statutory age at which he
can be tried as an adult criminal. If the alleged offense is so grave
that juvenile law would be inappropriate, a hearing to determine
whether or not to waive the authority of the juvenile court, can be
resorted to. In the main, such an action will not be required. It
is unrealistic to wait until a youth reaches a certain age and then
bring charges against him as an adult for an offense which was
committed as a juvenile.
JOHN C. GOLDEN
AUTOMOBILES-WHAT LAW GOVERNS-AN ABROGATION OF LEX
Loci DELECTI IN CONFLICT OF LAws-While the plaintiff and
defendant were on a temporary pleasure trip to South Dakota
they were involved in an automobile accident which resulted in
plaintiff sustaining serious and permanent injuries, incurred when
the defendant negligently drove his vehicle off the road. At the time
of the accident both young men were residents of the state of Minne-
sota. A motion by the defendant to obtain a summary judgment based
apparently on the doctrine of lex loci delect,' had been denied and
on appeal the Minnesota Supreme Court, affirming the dismissal,
35. See State v. Jackman, 93 N.W.2d. 425 (N.D. 1958).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-02 (1960).
1. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 384 (1934) "(1) If a cause of action in tort
is created at the place of the wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other states.
(2) If no cause of action is created at the place of the wrong, no recovery in tort can be
had in any other state."
RECENT CASES
held that the law of the domicile of the parties and not that of the
place of the tort applied. As a result the plaintiff was not barred from
recovery by the South Dakota guest statute,2 but instead was allowed
recovery under the common law doctrine to which Minnesota ad-
heres, permitting recovery for ordinary negligence. Kopp v Recht-
ztgel, 141 N.W.2d 526 (Minn. 1966)
The instant case is one more step in an historic reversal of the
heretofore established rule of conflicts that lex loci delecti governs
the applicable law in such situations.8 This same court had stated
earlier in Schmidt v Driscoll Hotel4 that the doctrine of lex loci
delectz would not be applied where an opposite result would be more
in conformity with the principles of equity and justice. 5 In the in-
stant case the court applied the reasoning of a companion case6 in
which it was indicated that the same deliberation that had motivated
the rejection of "the place of the tort" doctrine in the Schmidt case
would be applicable to automobile negligence cases.'
The policy considerations behind the enactment of guest statutes
were discussed at great length by Judge Knutson of the Minnesota
Court in Phelps v Benson" but it was noted in the instant case
that regardless of how valid these arguments may be they have not
prompted the adoption of a guest statute by the legislature of this
state. The court makes the assertion that by rejecting the South
Dakota guest statute as a bar to recovery, it is simply giving effect
to the long-standing public policy governing the rights and liabilities
of its citizens. In actuality the court appears to be attempting to
pour new wine into old bottles,9 that is to explain new results in
2. S. D. CODE (1939) § 44.0362" "No person transported by the owner or operator of
a motor vehicle as his guest without compensation for such transportation shall have cause
of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death, or loss in case
of accident "
3. See generally, Baade, New Trends in the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PROB. 673 (1963) Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, Ehrenzwelg, Leflar, Reese, Comments on
Babcock v. Jackson, a Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212
(1963) Gorfinkel, Conflict of Laws - a Survey of Past and Contemporary Theory, 16
HAsT INGs L, J. 21 (1964). (Hereinafter cited as Gorfinkel).
4. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d. 365 (1957). In this case the Minnesota Court provided
a remedy for the damaged party that would not have been permitted if Wisconsin law
(where the passenger was Injured) were applied. Liability for the conduct of the people
who were obviously intoxicated was placed upon the person who made the illegal: liquor
sale under a Minnesota "dram-shop" act. in this widely-cited opinion, the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws §§ 377, 378 were expressly rejected because the Court felt that since all
parties involved were Minnesota residents, the application of Minnesota law would give
them protection the state intended they enjoy Section 377, the place of wrong in multi-state
tort actions is the state where the tort event necessary to make an actor liable for a tort
took place. Section 378, the law of the place of the wrong determines whether a person
has sustained a legal injury.
5. Id. at 368.
6. Baits v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d. 66 (Minn. 1966). This case involved an action by a
parent against a child for injuries sustained In a Wisconsin automobile accident.
7. Id. at 68.
8. 252 Minn. 457, 90 N.W.2d. 533 (1958).
9. Gorfinkel, supra note 3, at 39.-
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the framework of traditional methods. Anyone interested in under-
standing the real significance of this shift in emphasis must be
extremely aware of the language being used to explain and justify
these new results.' 0
The reasoning of the instant case follows closely that in the New
York case of Babcock v Jackson"l which has been referred to as
"the most important conflicts case of the century "112 In that land-
mark decision both plaintiff and defendant were New York state
residents who had been driving together in Ontario, Canada, when
the defendant's vehicle collided with a wall causing severe injury
to the plaintiff. An action commenced in the New York Court, and
in that fact situation, which closely parallels the one presented in
the instant case, the New York Court of Appeals held that the law
of the domicile, rather than that of the loci delectz, would be applied.
In that case the court rejected the older rule because it found that
the Ontario statute reflected that province's fear of collusion between
persons that could be injurious to its insurers' s and they further
concluded that since Ontario's only contact with the incident was
the chance occurrence of the accident, the imposition of liability on
the defendant would not affect these insurers. 4 Notably, both the
instant case and the Babcock case make clear the fact that they
do not intend to interfere in any way with the legitimate interests
of the foreign state and that their determinations in one area would
not preclude the possibility of the application of the lex loci delecti
in another area within the same case. 15 Motor vehicle regulation
was singled out in both cases to exemplify this,16 because each state
has a legitimate interest in maintaining safety on its roads and this
interest extends to all persons who drive within its jurisdiction.',
Therefore, it can be concluded that while contact with the accident
is not relevant to the legal consequences flowing from the host-guest
relationship it may serve as the basis for some other issue involved
in the same case. The theoretical basis for the Babcock decision
was the so-called "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts"
doctrine. 8 Judge Fuld's opinion simply asked which state had the
greater or more direct interest in the matter and then applied the
law of that state.
It was favorably noted in the Babcock decision that a recent
10. See generally Gorfinkel, supra note 3.
11. 12 N.Y.2d. 473, 191 N.E.2d. 279, 240 N.T.S.2d. 743 (1963), reversing 17 App. Div.2d.
694, 230 N.Y.S.2d. 114 (1962).
12. The Impact of Babcock v. Jackson on Conflict of Laws, 52 VA. L. REV. 302 (1966).
13. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 11 at 284.
14. Ibid.
15. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 11.
16. Ibid.
17. Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 141 N.W.2d. 526 (Minn. 1966).
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draft of the Restatement, Second, adopted the most significant re-
lationship rule. 20 The Restatement, Second, also set down the rules
to be used in determining what contact would be considered most
important in deciding which state had the most significant relation-
ship.21 There are four contacts enumerated to act as guides for
the forum in determining this relationship:
(1) the place where the injury occurred;
(2) the place where the contact occurred;
(3) the domicile, nationality, place of corporation and place
of business of the parties;
(4) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
22
The relative importance of each of these contacts is to be determined
by the specific character of the tort, the issue and the policy behind
the tort rules involved.23 The only drawback to this position is that
the contacts are purportedly ranked in order of their importance
24
and this would then be merely a sophisticated restatement of the
rule of lex loci delecth, not as the exclusive factor, but as the most
important one in the grouping of contacts.
25
The Babcock decision is fashioned m a way that allows for the
consideration of a number of factors alien to the position of the
Restatement, Second: where the trip originated, where it was to
conclude, where the beneficiary of the insurance contract resided,
where the vehicle was licensed, where it was garaged and, finally,
where it was insured. 2  The advantage of this approach over the
Restatement, Second (and the Restatement also) is that it allows
each issue to be decided on its own merits and avoids the establish-
ment of a formal set of contacts.27  The biggest flaw in this phil-
osophy is that it does not give enough direction to the lower courts
to help them decide which contacts ought to dominate in a specific
case.
2 8
18. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 11 at 282. See also Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155,
124 N.E.2d. 99 (1954).
19. Babcock v. Jackson, supra note 11 at 283, 284.
20. RESTATEmENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 379 (1). See also Introductory Note to Topic
One of Chapter 9, p. 3 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1963).
21. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 379 (A-K).
22. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 379 (2).
23. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 379 (3).
24. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 379 comment b.
25. Conflict in the Conflict of Laws A Need for Uniformit, 61 N.W.L. REv. 329
(1961). (Hereinafter cited as 61 N.W.L. REvIEW).
26. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d. 473, 191 N.E.2d. 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d. 743 (1963)
reversing 17 App. Div.2d 694, 230 N.Y.S.2d. 114 (1962).
27. 61 N.W.L. Rlv. 339.
28. Dym v. Gordon, 22 App. Div. 702, 245 N.Y.S.2d. 656 (1963), affd 16 N.Y.2d. 120,
209 N.E.2d. 792 (1965).
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The choice of law theory in America has undergone a great
deal of alteration 29 since Judge Story assumed that a forum adjudi-
cating an occurrence arising out of an event rooted in a foreign
jurisdiction would, as a matter of comity, look to and utilize the
law of that foreign jurisdiction as the basis of its decision. 0 In
those days a forum was expected, but not required, to look to
foreign law 31 This view was championed and popularized by Mr
Justice Holmes on the bench 32 and Professor Beale in academic
circles,3 3 and finally it became the dominant philosophy of the Re-
statement of Conflict Laws.3 4  As a result of the reaction against
this "vested rights" or Iex locL delect doctrine the "local law theory"
emerged. 5 It emphasized the notion that no jurisdiction ever ap-
;plies any law other than its own, and that it included in its own
law certain doctrines directing the use of foreign law in certain in-
stances. 86 There is little doubt that the "local law theory" provided
the impetus necessary for jurists to seek out and find a new theory
to replace the old vested rights principle, even though it was not
itself equal to the task.
The courts have apparently found ways to avoid the application
of lex oct delecti by claiming it to be contrary to their established
public policy, by asserting things to be procedural which m actual-
ity are substantive so that they would not be bound to apply the
law of the foreign jurisdiction, or by reveling in a variety of fabri-
cations and myths. It is surprising, however, that it has taken this
long for the rule to be specifically renounced.
The rejection of lex locL delectL is far from universal, however,
and this is the particular problem which confronts the conflicts area
today Recently the Delaware Supreme Court handed down a deci-
sion in Friday v SMootS7 which adhered strictly, if somewhat sur-
prisingly, to the old rule. The court in that case conceded that
Delaware had the more significant relationship with the occurrence
but nevertheless applied lex loct delecti. In view of the increasingly
29. See generally, Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of Laws- Their Role and
Utility, 58 HAav. L. REv. 361 (1945). (Hereinafter cited as 58 HAEV. L. REv.)
30. 58 HAv. L. Rv. 363, Ehrenzweig, American Conflicts Law in its Historical
Perspective, Should the Restatement be "Continued," 103 U. PA. . REv. 133, 135, (1954).
See also ENRENZWEiG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (West St. Paul. 1959).
31. Gorfinkel, aupra note 3, at 22.
32. See Slater v. Mexican R. R. 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) , Mutual Life insurance Co.
v. Liebing 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
33. See 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws (1935).
34. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 59-70 (1934).
35. Gorfinkel, supra note 3, at 26.
36. Id. at 27.
37. 211 A.2d. 594 (Del. 1965). Here the court held that the Delaware Guest Statute
did not act as a bar to recovery in a case involving a Delaware guest and a Delaware
suit against a Delaware driver because the accident occurred in New Jersey and was there-
fore governed by New Jersey law.
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evident trend toward greater emphasis upon policy considerations88
this opinion seems conspicuously erroneous and unrealistic. This
lack of accord from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is extremely danger-
ous. It leads to positions that cannot possibly be reconciled with
one another and this necessarily must breed forum-shopping.
In the final analysis each court must determine whether the
mechanistic stability and uniformity of the lex loci delecti doctrine
with its thoughtless application is worth the price that must be paid.
It seems that it is not, because as has been pointed out, courts
have always found ways of avoiding its application, and because
it stands as a monumental obstacle in the path of progressing to-
ward meaningful and necessary public policy considerations. The
overwhelming majority of writers are opposed to its retention, and
contemporary cases are running clearly contra to it. The problem,
of course, is that there is a good deal of spirited debate as to what
is the proper method for analyzing and solving these problems. At
the present time, the choice of law doctrine finds itself in a muddled
and embarrassing posture. Only time and a creative, responsible
judiciary can lead us to a more sound and consistent position. Minne-
sota appears to be headed clearly in the right direction.
SAL MARTOCHE
CRIMINAL LAW-ADMISSIONS BY ACCUSED-TACIT ADMISSION BY
SILENCE-While in jail on a charge of burglary, the confession of
the defendant's confederate was read to the defendant by the police,
after the defendant was informed by the police of his right to
remain silent. The defendant, Staino, remained silent or periodically
said, "I have nothing to say " His failure to deny was received in
evidence at the trial as a tacit admission and the defendant appealed
his conviction. The equally divided Superior Court of Pennsylvania
affirmed the conviction and held the evidence was admissible under
the tacit admissions doctrine.' Commonwealth v Cavell, 207 Pa.
Super 274, 217 A.2d 824 (1966)
The tacit admissions doctrine 2 is an exception to the exclusion-
38. Babcock v. Jackson, aupra note 26, Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1,
203 A.2d. 796 (1964) , Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d. 553 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963).
1. The dissenting justices said the doctrine violated the rules of self-incrimination.
2. [W]hen a statement made in the presence and hearing of a person is incrim-
inating in character and naturally calls for a denial but is not challenged or contradicted
by the accused although he has opportunity and liberty to speak, the statement and the
fact of his failure to deny are admissible in evidence as an implied admission of the
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